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Summary
Energy is essential for life and vital for de-
velopment. Affordable energy directly con-
tributes to reducing poverty and improving 
productivity and the quality of life. This 
paper discusses three groups of factors that 
affecting crude oil prices. 
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Introduction
According to many researchers, the cor-
relation between supply and demand was 
the main factor driving oil price fluctua-
tions in 20th century. For some time after 
the end of the Gulf War in 1991, oil prices 
remained relatively stable around USD 
20 per barrel. A minor decline caused by 
the Asian economic crisis was recorded 
in 1997-1999, but after the US economy 
recovered from the 9/11 attacks in 2001, 
the price of oil started to dramatically rise. 
Initially, price growth was attributed to 
fundamental factors such as production 
cuts by OPEC against steadily rising global 
demand in both developed and develop-
ing countries. According to EIA  (2017), 
oil demand in China alone grew by 15% 
in 2004. However, according to the same 
source, global growth in consumption 
was gradual throughout the entire period 
analysed and did not exceed production 
increase. Kaufmann (2011) emphasizes 
that even though the volume of produc-
tion did not change dramatically, increase 
in oil prices could still be caused by sup-
ply-side fundamentals. Non-OPEC coun-
tries are usually seen as price takers in oil 
production, and OPEC states follow some 
form of a strategic behaviour. This means 
that an unexpected change in the market 
share of OPEC producers can generate 
a supply shock. According to Kaufmann 
(2011), this is exactly what happened in 
2004, when a decade-long steady growth 
in non-OPEC production was over and 
was compensated by growth in OPEC pro-
duction.
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Results
Supply-demand fundamentals
 
The structural conditions in a country’s 
economy influence correlation between oil 
prices and economic growth. In develop-
ing countries a higher ratio of the economy 
comprised manufacturing industries, which 
are more energy intensive than services. 
Although the amount of oil used for trans-
portation usually represents a smaller share 
in the total oil consumption in non-OECD 
countries, it tends to increase rapidly, as 
expanding economies increase the need to 
move goods and people. The per capita ve-
hicle ownership also correlates highly with 
rising incomes and has considerable room 
to grow in non-OECD countries. For these 
reasons, non-OECD economic growth 
rates tend to be an important factor affect-
ing oil prices. As a result of China’s strong 
economic growth, it has become the larg-
est energy consumer and the second larg-
est oil consumer in the world. In addition, 
China’s rising oil consumption has been a 
major contributor to incremental growth 
in worldwide oil consumption. EIA predicts 
that virtually all the net increase in oil con-
sumption in the next 25 years will come 
from non-OECD countries.
While oil consumption is primarily 
related to the current economic activity, 
changes in the outlook for future econom-
ic conditions can also have an immediate 
impact on oil prices. An improvement in 
the economic outlook tends to increase the 
chance of future tightening in the oil mar-
kets, which in turn results in higher expect-
ed future oil prices. This change in expecta-
tions  is then reflected in higher oil futures 
prices. Rise in futures prices increases the 
incentive to hold inventories, which in turn 
decreases the available current supply and 
tends to raise current prices. Figure 1 shows 
how the projections of economic growth in 
non-OECD countries have changed over 
time for various forecast years. Estimates 
Figure 1: Changes in the expectations of economic growth can affect oil prices
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of economic growth for 2008 fell as the 
year progressed (as did oil prices), and 
growth estimates for 2009 increased stead-
ily throughout the year (as did oil prices).
Speculation
Market participants not only buy and sell 
physical quantities of oil, but also trade 
contracts for the future delivery of oil and 
other energy derivatives. One of the roles 
of futures markets is price discovery, and as 
such, these markets play a role in influenc-
ing oil prices. 
Oil market trading activity involves a 
range of participants with motivations that 
vary, even within an individual participant. 
Some, such as oil producers and airlines, 
have a significant commercial exposure to 
changes in the price of oil and petroleum-
based fuels, and may seek to hedge their 
risks by buying and selling energy deriva-
tives. For example, an airline may want to 
buy futures or options in order to avoid the 
possibility that its future fuel costs will rise 
above a certain level, while an oil producer 
may want to sell futures in order to lock in 
a price for its future output. 
In recent years, investors have also 
shown interest in adding energy and other 
commodities as alternatives to equity and 
bond investments to diversify their port-
folios or to hedge inflation risks. Every 
transaction must involve both a buyer and 
a seller, and the desired “long” buyer and 
“short” seller positions of those with direct 
commercial interests in the oil market do 
not necessarily equal each other. Banks, 
hedge funds, and other “non-commercial” 
investors can add liquidity to futures and 
derivative markets by taking the other side 
of transactions with commercial partici-
pants. On the other hand, concerns have 
been raised that non-commercial commod-
ity trading and investment may “use up” 
liquidity and amplify price movements, par-
ticularly at times when a momentum runs 
strongly in a particular direction. 
Activity in commodity exchange con-
tracts has risen in recent years. One meas-
ure of activity in futures markets is open 
interest on exchanges, which indicates 
the number of contracts in a trading ses-
sion that have not been settled or closed. 
Open interest on exchange-traded crude 
oil futures contracts increased substantially 
over the past decade, as measured by the 
New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), 
the main commodities exchange for en-
ergy products in the United States. Both 
commercial participants (those that have 
a direct interest in physical oil production, 
consumption, or trade) and non-commer-
cial investors (money managers and funds 
that are interested in trading contracts for 
investment and diversification purposes) 
have shown increased trading activity. 
Care must be taken in interpreting these 
data, however, because the vast majority of 
positions are held in the less transparent over-
the-counter (OTC) market rather than on 
stock exchanges. In addition to futures con-
tracts, another way for market participants to 
invest in crude oil is through the buying and 
selling of options contracts. Options allow 
for investment exposure with limited poten-
tial for losses and provide an insurance-like 
instrument against adverse commodity price 
movements. Figure 2 shows the quarterly av-
erage of the number of outstanding oil fu-
tures contracts at the end of each NYMEX 
trading day. Trading in oil futures increased 
substantially with increase in crude oil as in-
vestment between 2003 and 2007.
The strong world economy between 
2003 and 2007 with an average global 
growth rate of almost 5% (IMF) resulted 
in excess global liquidity and a subsequent 
boom in financial markets. Numerous new 
financial derivatives were created, and large 
amounts of speculative funds were invested 
in crude oil futures. New actors appeared 
on the crude oil market, taking long posi-
tions on futures contracts to profit from 
price fluctuations rather than hedging the 
risk of physical commodity prices. The role
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Figure 2: Open interest growth in crude oil futures exchanges 
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f extrapolative expectations in oil price rise 
was described by Masters (2008) and em-
pirically confirmed by (Cifarelli–Paladino, 
2009). Crude oil markets are beginning to 
show new features, they are now increasing-
ly interrelated with other financial markets, 
such as the exchange rate market, stock 
markets and the futures market (Fan–Xu, 
2011). Oil is traded globally in US dollars 
and is closely tied to its value. Based on this, 
Bhar and Malliaris (2011) argue that depre-
ciation in the US dollar is one of the factors 
causing increase in oil prices, as oil suppli-
ers demand their compensation for the de-
clining value of this currency.
Fan and Xu (2011) identify the “bub-
ble accumulation” period between March 
2004 and June 2008, when vast amounts of 
global hedge funds started to pour money 
into the energy futures market, which thus 
promoted the forming of commodity price 
bubbles, especially in oil futures market. 
Despite a delicate balance, the supply and 
demand fundamentals did not seem to be 
important driving forces affecting crude 
oil price changes. This is in line with Kauf-
mann and Ullman (2009), who assumed 
that the oil market might have undergone 
structural changes in September 2004. 
June 2008 was marked by another struc-
tural break. Influenced by the 2008 financial 
crisis and global liquidity shortage, oil posi-
tions were rapidly closed, investment funds 
started to withdraw from oil futures markets, 
and the price of crude oil crashed. During 
this time, speculation was not driving force 
of crude oil prices anymore, and role of eco-
nomic fundamentals was re-established.
During the global financial crisis (2008-
2009), markets saw a dramatic increase in 
the correlation between crude oil and other 
commodities, as demand decreased for raw 
materials. However, both before and after 
the world economic slowdown, there were 
observable increases in the correlations be-
tween commodity prices. At the same time as 
this rise in correlations was a rise in interest 
in general commodity exposure. A growing 
number of investors were exposed to risk 
in commodities by investing in index-funds 
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market instruments that pose exposure to 
commodity baskets. These index funds usu-
ally establish shares in various energy and 
other commodities to provide diversity across 
a range of commodities. Exchange traded 
funds (ETFs), bought and sold throughout 
the day like individual common stocks, are 
also an increasingly popular means for inves-
tors, including individuals, to gain exposure 
to commodities as an asset class.
Correlation is not the same as causation, 
however, and the relationship between crude 
oil and other financial markets is complex. 
Even with observed movements in correla-
tion levels, the mutual influences between 
crude oil price changes and changes in val-
ues of other asset classes are unclear. It is 
possible, for example, that high correlations 
are due to several primary relationships with 
a third common factor, such as economic 
growth expectations. Another complicating 
factor is that these relationships and their 
strength vary over time. The prices of crude 
oil and other commodities started to move 
together in recent years. The darker colours 
in Figure 3 indicate higher correlations (co-
movements) between the daily price chang-
es of crude oil futures and several other 
commodities futures, calculated for each 
quarter. Interestingly, the historically strong 
correlation between oil and natural gas pric-
es has recently ceased in North America, as 
natural gas prices have been kept down by 
the rapid development of shale gas.
Prior to 2007, stocks, bonds and ex-
change rates showed only infrequent, fleet-
ing correlations to oil futures prices. In con-
trast, the price of crude oil showed positive 
correlations with stocks between 2008 and 
2010, negative correlations with the value 
of the US dollar during most of the period 
between the late-2007 and the present, and 
more irregular but often negative correla-
tions with bond prices during 2008 and 2010.
For each asset class, there are financial, 
physical and common underlying econom-
ic factors, such as the economic downturn 
and recovery, that may influence these more 
significant correlations. Financial factors in-
clude developments such as the growing in-
terest in crude oil as an investment asset over 
the last decade. This investment interest has
Figure 3:  Correlations between the daily changes in the futures prices of crude oil  
and other commodities 
Correlations between daily price changes of crude oil and other commodities
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
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Negative Correlation Positive Correlation
Source: EIA, 2017
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Figure 4: Correlations between daily returns on crude oil futures and financial investments 
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1   U.S. Dollar Index (DXY), which is a weighted index of a basket of currencies, per U.S. dollar. As 
the dollar strengthens against other currencies, the value of the index rises.
2   U.S. bonds is based on the negative of the change in yield on 30-year U.S. government bonds 
because as yields rise, bond prices fall.
3   Inflation Expectations are based on daily changes in the 5 year Treasury - TIPS (Treasury Inflation 
Protected Securities) spread. 
Source: EIA, 2017
altered financial money flow into and out 
of commodities. Physical crude oil markets 
can also be influenced by external factors. 
Exchange rates and economic factors play a 
role in crude oil production and consump-
tion, possibly leading to price correlations. 
Figure 4 shows the correlations (co-move-
ments) between oil futures prices and other 
financial markets on a daily basis. In recent 
years, oil prices and the S&P 500 have tended 
to move together, while oil prices have tend-
ed to move in the opposite direction of the 
dollar exchange rate and Treasury bonds.
Extreme and irregular events
Zhang et al. (2009) define extreme events as 
events which have serious impacts on crude 
oil markets lasting several years. Examples 
are the Gulf War of 1990-1991 and the re-
cent global economic crisis. Irregular events 
are defined as events which have important 
but short-term effects on crude oil prices. Se-
lected geopolitical events contributing to oil 
price development are captured in Figure 4, 
which shows, as also confirmed by numerous 
authors, that extreme and irregular events 
can act as driving forces for crude oil price 
fluctuations in both long and short term.
Much of the world’s crude oil is located 
in regions that have historically been prone 
to political upheaval or have had their 
oil production disrupted due to political 
events. Several major oil price shocks have 
occurred at the same time as supply disrup-
tions triggered by political events, most no-
tably the Arab Oil Embargo in 1973-1974, 
the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq 
war in the late 1970s and early 1980s, or the 
Persian Gulf War in 1990. More recently, 
disruptions to supply (or curbs on the po-
tential development of resources) by politi-
cal events have been seen in Nigeria, Ven-
ezuela, Iraq, Iran and Libya (EIA, 2017).
Given the history of oil supply disruptions 
emanating from political events, market par-
ticipants are always assessing the possibility 
of future disruptions and their potential im-
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pacts. In addition to the size and duration of 
a potential disruption, they also consider the 
availability of crude stocks and the ability of 
other producers to offset a potential supply 
loss. For example, if the market has ample 
spare production capacity to offset a pos-
sible disruption, its likely impact on prices 
would be smaller than if spare production 
capacity was much lower. When there are sig-
nificant concerns about the potential for a 
disruption at a time when spare capacity and 
inventories are not seen as sufficient to sub-
stantially offset the associated loss in supply, 
prices may be above the level that might be 
expected if only current demand and supply 
were considered, as forward-looking behav-
iour adds a “risk premium”.
Weather can also play a significant role 
in oil supply. Hurricanes in 2005, for exam-
ple, shut down oil and natural gas produc-
tion as well as refineries. As a result, petro-
leum product prices increased sharply as 
supplies to the market dropped. Severely 
cold weather can strain product markets as 
producers attempt to supply enough of the 
product, such as heating oil, to consumers 
in a short amount of time, resulting in high-
er prices. Other events such as refinery out-
ages or pipeline problems can restrict the 
flow of oil and products, driving up prices.
Figure 5: Crude oil prices and special events
Updated: Quarterly | Last Updated: 09/30/2018
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However, the influence of these types 
of factors on oil prices tends to be relatively 
short lived. Once the problem subsides and 
oil and product flows return to normal, prices 
usually return to previous levels (EIA, 2017).
Zhang et al. (2009) also claim that the 
amount of extreme and irregular events 
is bigger in recent years of high crude oil 
price volatility.
Figure 5 presents the correlation be-
tween crude oil prices and various events.
Quality differentials
Crude oil is traded in a global market. 
Prices of the many crude oil streams 
produced globally tend to move closely 
together, although there are persistent 
differentials between light-weight, low-
sulphur (light-sweet) grades and heavier, 
higher-sulphur (heavy-sour) crudes that 
are lower in quality. Many types of crude 
oil are produced around the world. Varia-
tions in quality and location result in price 
differentials, but because oil markets are 
integrated globally, prices tend to move 
together.  
 
Summary
Most researchers agree that the role of fac-
tors changed over time, and there were 
structural breaks in crude oil price devel-
opment. However, there is no consensus 
among the authors on the specific inputs 
by each factor, which causes especially in-
tense debates about the reasons for the 
high volatility of oil prices in recent years. 
Inter alia, Masters (2008), Cifarelli and 
Paladino (2009) and others argue that 
speculative attacks have had a key role in 
crude oil price development since 2000. 
An analysis by Hamilton (2008) revealed 
that price increases were caused by strong 
global demand and that speculation alone 
is insufficient to explain rapid growth in oil 
prices. Supply-side changes are the subject 
of Kaufmann’s studies (2011).
In any case, a single factor can hardly 
explain crude oil price development and 
the especially high volatility seen in recent 
years. With the evolution of financial mar-
kets, the driving mechanism has become 
more complex. Moreover, we should keep 
it in mind that various factors are respon-
sible for the long-term trend and the short-
term price speculations.
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